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Abstract. We propose a method to prepare different non-Poissonian signal pulses
from sources of Poissonian photon number distribution using only linear optical
elements and threshold photon detectors. This method allows a simple passive
preparation of decoy states for quantum key distribution. We show that the resulting
key rates are comparable to the performance of active choices of intensities of
Poissonian signals.
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The main benchmark to compare different quantum key distribution (QKD)
systems is their secret key rate over a given distance [1]. For example, it is well known
that QKD schemes with single photon sources can provide a key generation rate of
linear behavior with the transmission efficiency of the quantum channel. Unfortunately,
single photon sources are still beyond our present experimental capability and QKD
implementations with phase randomized weak coherent pulses (WCP) are typically
employed. In this context, it has been recently shown that decoy state QKD with WCP
can basically reach the same performance as single photon sources [2, 3, 4]. The essential
idea behind decoy state QKD is quite simple. The sender (Alice) varies, independently
and randomly, the mean photon number of each signal state she transmits to the receiver
(Bob). This is usually performed by using a variable optical attenuator together with
a random number generator. From the measurement results corresponding to different
intensity settings, the legitimate users can obtain a better estimation of the behavior of
the quantum channel, which translates into an enhancement of the achievable secret key
rate and distance. This technique has been successfully implemented in several recent
experiments [5, 6, 7], which show the practical feasibility of this method.
While active modulation of the intensity of the pulses suffices to perform decoy
state QKD in principle, in practice passive preparation might be desirable in some
scenarios. For instance, in those setups operating at high transmission rates. Known
passive methods rely on the use of a parametric down-conversion source together with
a photon detector [8, 9, 10]. In this Letter we show that phase randomized WCP can
also be used for the same purpose, i.e., one does not need a non-linear optics network
preparing entangled states. Note that the crucial requirement of a passive decoy state
setup is to have correlations between the photon number statistics of different signals;
hence it is sufficient that these correlations are classical. Our method uses only linear
optical elements and a threshold photon detector. For simplicity, we consider that this
detector has perfect detection efficiency and no dark counts. But this analysis can
also be adapted to cover the case of imperfect detectors. A similar technique can also
be applied to heralded single-photon sources showing non-Poissonian photon number
statistics [11].
The key idea is rather simple, although it is counter-intuitive. It is illustrated
in Fig. 1. When two phase randomized WCP, ρµ1 = e
−µ1
∑
∞
n=0 µ
n
1/n!|n〉〈n| and
ρµ2 = e
−µ2
∑
∞
n=0 µ
n
2/n!|n〉〈n|, interfere at a beam splitter (BS) of transmittance t,
the photon number statistics of the two outcome signals are classically correlated.
To see this, let us first consider the interference of two pure coherent states with
fixed phase relation, |√µ1eiφ1〉 and |√µ2eiφ2〉, at a BS. The output signals are given
by |√µ1teiφ1 + i
√
µ2(1− t)eiφ2〉a|i
√
µ1(1− t)eiφ1 +
√
µ2te
iφ2〉
b
. The joint probability
pn,m of having n photons in mode a and m photons in mode b is the product of two
Poissonian distributions: pn,m = e
−υ/2(υγ)n/n!×e−υ/2[υ(1−γ)]m/m!, with υ = µ1+µ2,
γ = [µ1t+ µ2(1− t) + ξ cos θ]/υ, ξ = 2
√
µ1µ2(1− t)t and θ = pi/2 + φ2 − φ1. The case
of two phase randomized WCP can be solved by just integrating pn,m over all angles θ,
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Figure 1. Interference of two phase randomized WCP, ρµ1 and ρµ2 , at a beam splitter
(BS) of transmittance t. a and b represent the two output modes.
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Figure 2. (A) Conditional photon number distribution in mode a (see Fig. 1): rc
n
(black) and rc¯
n
(grey) for the case µ1 = µ2 = 1 and t = 1/2. (B) r
c
n
(black) versus a
Poissonian distribution of the same mean photon number (grey).
i.e.,
pn,m =
υn+me−υ
n!m!
1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
γn(1− γ)mdθ. (1)
By measuring one outcome signal, the conditional photon number statistics of the
remaining signal varies depending on the result obtained. Specifically, whenever one
ignores the result of the measurement the total probability of finding n photons in
mode a can be expressed as
ptn =
∞∑
m=0
pn,m =
υn
n!
1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
γne−υγdθ, (2)
which turns out to be a non-Poissonian probability distribution. The joint probability
for seeing n photons in mode a and no click in the threshold detector has the form
pc¯n = pn,0 =
υne−υ
n!
1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
γndθ. (3)
If the detector produces a click, the joint probability of finding n photons in mode a is
given by pcn = p
t
n − pc¯n. Fig. 2 (Case A) shows the conditional photon number statistics
of the outcome signal in mode a depending on the result of the detector (click and not
click): rcn ≡ pcn/(1 − F ) and rc¯n ≡ pc¯n/F , with F ≡
∑
∞
n=0 p
c¯
n = e
−[µ1(1−t)+µ2t]I0,ξ, and
where Iq,z represents the modified Bessel function of the first kind [12]. This figure
includes as well a comparison between rcn and a Poissonian distribution of the same
mean photon number (Case B). Both distributions, rc¯n and r
c
n, are also non-Poissonian.
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To perform decoy state QKD, we consider that Alice and Bob treat no click and
click events separately, and they distill secret key from both of them. We use the secret
key rate formula provided by Refs. [13, 14],
R ≥ max{Rc, 0}+max{Rc¯, 0}, (4)
with Rc = q{−Qcf(Ec)H(Ec) + pc1Y1[1 − H(e1)] + pc0Y0}, and similarly for Rc¯. The
parameter q is the efficiency of the protocol (q = 1/2 for the standard Bennett-Brassard
1984 protocol [15], and q ≈ 1 for its efficient version [16]), Qc is the overall gain of the
signals, Ec represents the overall quantum bit error rate (QBER), f(Ec) is the error
correction efficiency [typically f(Ec) ≥ 1 with Shannon limit f(Ec) = 1], Yn denotes the
yield of a n-photon signal, i.e., the conditional probability of a detection event on Bob’s
side given that Alice transmits an n-photon state, e1 is the single photon error rate, and
H(x) = −x log2 (x)− (1− x) log2 (1− x) is the binary Shannon entropy function.
The quantities Qc, Ec, Qc¯, and E c¯ are directly accessible from the experiment. They
can be written as Qc =
∑
∞
n=0 p
c
nYn and Q
cEc =
∑
∞
n=0 p
c
nYnen, and similarly for the case
of a no click event. Here en denotes the error rate of a n-photon signal (e0 = 1/2 for
random background). To apply the secret key rate formula given by Eq. (4) one needs to
estimate a lower bound on Y1, together with an upper bound on e1. For that, we follow
the procedure proposed in Ref. [17]. This method requires that ptn and p
c¯
n satisfy certain
conditions that we checked numerically. Note, however, that many other estimation
techniques are also available, like, for instance, linear programming tools. We obtain
Y1 ≥ Y l1 ≡ max
{
0,
pc¯2Q
t − pt2Qc¯ − (pc¯2pt0 − pt2pc¯0)Y u0
pc¯2p
t
1 − pt2pc¯1
}
, (5)
where Qt = Qc +Qc¯, and Y u0 denotes an upper bound on the background rate Y0 given
by Y u0 = min{(2E c¯Qc¯)/pc¯0, (2EtQt)/pt0}. The error rate e1 can be upper bounded as
e1 ≤ eu1 ≡ min
{
E c¯Qc¯ − pc¯0Y l0e0
pc¯1Y
l
1
,
EcQc − pc0Y l0e0
pc1Y
l
1
,
pc¯0E
tQt − pt0E c¯Qc¯
(pc¯0p
t
1 − pt0pc¯1)Y l1
}
, (6)
with QtEt = QcEc + Qc¯E c¯, and where Y l0 denotes a lower bound on Y0 given by
Y0 ≥ Y l0 ≡ max{0, (pt1Qc¯ − pc¯1Qt)/(pt1pc¯0 − pc¯1pt0)}.
The only relevant statistics to evaluate Y l0 , Y
l
1 , and e
u
1 are p
t
n and p
c¯
n, with n = 0, 1, 2.
These probabilities can be obtained by solving Eqs. (2)-(3). After a short calculation,
we find that pc¯0 = e
−υ, pc¯1 = ωe
−υ, and pc¯2 = (2ω
2 + ξ2)e−υ/4, with ω = µ1t + µ2(1 − t).
The probabilities ptn have the form p
t
0 = I0,ξe
−ω, pt1 = [ωI0,ξ − ξI1,ξ]e−ω, and pt2 =
[ω2I0,ξ + (1− 2ω)ξI1,ξ + ξ2I2,ξ]e−ω/2.
For simulation purposes we consider the channel model used in Refs. [3, 17]. This
model reproduces a normal behaviour of the quantum channel, i.e., in the absence of
eavesdropping. It allows us to calculate the observed experimental parameters Qc¯, E c¯,
Qt, and Et. Our results, however, can also be applied to any other quantum channel,
as they only depend on the observed gains and QBERs. In the scenario considered,
the yields have the form Yn = 1 − (1 − Y0)(1 − η)n, where η represents the overall
transmittance of the system [3, 17]. This parameter can be related with a transmission
Non-Poissonian statistics from Poissonian light sources 5
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 14010
−8
10−7
10−6
10−5
10−4
10−3
10−2
Fiber link [km]
Ke
y 
ge
ne
ra
tio
n 
ra
te
 [p
er 
pu
lse
]
 
 
Passive decoy
Active decoy
Figure 3. Lower bound on the secret key rate R given by Eq. (4) in logarithmic
scale for a passive decoy state setup with two intensity settings (dashed line). The
transmittance of the BS is t = 1/2. The solid line represents a lower bound on R for
an active asymptotic decoy state system [3].
distance l measured in km for the given QKD scheme as η = 10−
αl
10 , where α represents
the loss coefficient of the optical fiber measured in dB/km. The product Ynen can be
expressed as Ynen = Y0e0 + (Yn − Y0)ed, where ed is the probability that a photon
hits the wrong detector due to the misalignment in the quantum channel and in Bob’s
detection setup [3, 17]. After substituting these definitions into the gain and QBER
formulas we obtain Qc¯ = F − (1 − Y0)e(1−η)ω−υI0,(1−η)ξ , Qc¯E c¯ = (e0 − ed)Y0F + edQc¯,
Qt = 1− (1− Y0)e−ηωI0,ηξ and QtEt = (e0 − ed)Y0 + edQt.
The resulting secret key rate is illustrated in Fig. 3. The experimental parameters
are [18]: Y0 = 1.7 × 10−6, ed = 0.033, α = 0.21 dB/km, and Bob’s detection efficiency
equal to 0.045. We assume that q = 1, f(Ec) = f(E c¯) = 1.22, and t = 1/2, i.e., we
consider a simple 50 : 50 BS. With this configuration, it turns out that the optimal
values of the intensities µ1 and µ2 are almost constant with the distance. One of them
is quite weak (around 10−4), while the other one is around 0.55. Fig. 3 includes as well
the case of an active asymptotic decoy state QKD system [3]. The cutoff points where
the secret key rate drops down to zero are l ≈ 128 km (passive setup with two intensity
settings) and l ≈ 147 km (active asymptotic setup). One could reduce this gap further
by using a passive scheme with more intensity settings. For instance, one may employ
a photon number resolving detector instead of a simple threshold photon detector, or
use more threshold detectors in combination with BS. From these results we see that
the performance of the passive scheme is comparable to the active one, thus showing
the practical interest of the passive setup.
To conclude, we have analyzed a simple passive decoy state QKD system with phase
randomized WCP. This setup represents an alternative to those active schemes based
on the use of a variable optical attenuator. In the asymptotic limit of an infinite long
experiment, we have shown that this passive system can provide a similar performance
to the one achieved with an active source and infinity decoy settings. This idea can
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also be applied to other practical scenarios with different signals and detectors like, for
example, those based on thermal states or even strong coherent pulses in conjunction
with a regular photo-detector. Details of this analysis will be presented somewhere else.
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